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Abstract:  
We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring pro-
competitive effects and a competitive limit, and investigate the impact of trade on welfare 
and efficiency. Contrary to the constant elasticity case, in which all gains from trade are 
due to product diversity, our model allows for a welfare decomposition between gains 
from product diversity and gains from pro-competition effects. We then show that the 
market outcome is not efficient because too many firms operate at an inefficiently small 
scale by charging prices above marginal costs. Using pro-competitive effects and the 
competitive limit, we finally illustrate that trade raises efficiency by narrowing the gap 
between the equilibrium utility and the optimal utility. 
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1 Introduction
Few trade theorists would disagree with the statement that product diversity, scale economies,
and pro-competitive e®ects are central to any discussion about gains from trade and e±ciency
with di®erentiated goods under imperfect competition.1 Yet, it is fair to say that these ques-
tions have not been fully and jointly explored within a simple and solvable general equilibrium
model of monopolistic competition.2 This is largely due to the fact that the workhorse ap-
proach to international trade under monopolistic competition, namely the constant elasticity
of substitution (henceforth, CES) framework, displays two peculiar features. First, it does not
allow for pro-competitive e®ects so that \there is no e®ect of trade on the scale of production,
and the gains from trade come solely through increased product diversity" (Krugman, 1980,
p.953). Second, the equilibrium in the CES model is usually constrained (second-best) optimal,
i.e., the market provides the socially desirable number of varieties at an e±cient scale (Dixit
and Stiglitz, 1977). Consequently, trade is not e±ciency enhancing in the CES model because
it does not correct the only existing market failure, pricing above marginal cost.
In order to more fully explore gains from trade and e±ciency under monopolistic competi-
tion, we must depart from the standard CES model. Doing so, however, has long been di±cult
since variable elasticity of substitution (henceforth, VES) models have \not proved tractable,
and from Dixit and Norman (1980) and Krugman (1980) onwards, most writers have used
the CES speci¯cation" (Neary, 2004, p.177). Building on the new general equilibrium model of
monopolistic competition by Behrens and Murata (2007), we present a simple VES model of in-
ternational trade featuring pro-competitive e®ects (i.e., pro¯t-maximizing prices are decreasing
in the mass of competing ¯rms) and a competitive limit (i.e., pro¯t-maximizing prices converge
to marginal costs when the mass of competing ¯rms becomes arbitrarily large). Within this
framework, we investigate the impact of trade on welfare and e±ciency.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, unlike in the standard CES model, the
market outcome is not e±cient under autarky because too many ¯rms operate at an ine±ciently
small scale by charging prices above marginal costs.3 Second, due to pro-competitive e®ects,
markups in autarky are no longer the same across countries of di®erent sizes. Nevertheless,
1Dixit (2004, p.128) summarizes the gains from trade under monopolistic competition as follows: (i) avail-
ability of greater variety; (ii) better exploitation of economies of scale; and (iii) greater degree of competition,
driving prices closer to marginal costs. More recently, the World Trade Organization (2008, pp.48-50) provides
a similar classi¯cation: (i) gains from increased variety; (ii) gains from increased competition; and (iii) gains
from increased economies of scale.
2For instance, the World Trade Organization (2008, p.48) states that \(a)s far as the gains from intra-
industry trade are concerned, most studies have focused on either one of the variety, scale or pro-competitive
(price) e®ects of trade opening".
3Note that in a more general CES model, where market power and taste for variety are disentangled, the
equilibrium mass of ¯rms can be larger or smaller than the optimal one (Benassy, 1996). However, that
discrepancy is not due to pro-competitive e®ects because the model displays constant markups.
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we show that free trade leads not only to the equalization of price-wage ratios but also to
both product and factor price equalization, even when products are di®erentiated. Third, we
concisely illustrate that trade leads to an increase in the mass of varieties consumed, and to
a decrease in the mass of varieties produced in each country. In addition, we show that such
exit of ¯rms due to pro-competitive e®ects is accompanied by an increase in output per ¯rm,
which leads to a better exploitation of ¯rm-level scale economies. Fourth, contrary to the CES
case, in which all gains from trade are due to greater product diversity, our model allows for
a welfare decomposition between gains from product diversity and gains from pro-competitive
e®ects. Finally, using pro-competitive e®ects and the competitive limit, we illustrate that trade
raises e±ciency by narrowing the gap between the equilibrium utility and the optimal utility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, and
Section 3 focuses on the autarky case. Section 4 analyzes the trade equilibrium, decomposes
the gains from trade, and shows that trade integration drives prices closer to marginal costs,
thus enhancing e±ciency. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a world with two countries, labeled r and s. Variables associated with each country
will be subscripted accordingly. There is a mass Lr of workers/consumers in country r, and
each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor. Thus, Lr also stands for the total amount
of labor available in country r. We assume that labor is internationally immobile and that it
is the only factor of production.
2.1 Preferences
There is a single monopolistically competitive industry producing a horizontally di®erentiated
consumption good with a continuum of varieties. Let ­r (resp., ­s) be the set of varieties
produced in country r (resp., s), of measure nr (resp., ns). Hence, N ´ nr + ns stands for the
endogenously determined mass of available varieties in the global economy. A representative
consumer in country r solves the following consumption problem, with `constant absolute risk
aversion' (CARA) sub-utility functions (Behrens and Murata, 2007):
max
qrr(i); qsr(j)
Ur ´
Z
­r
£
1¡ e¡®qrr(i)¤ di+ Z
­s
£
1¡ e¡®qsr(j)¤ dj
s:t:
Z
­r
prr(i)qrr(i)di+
Z
­s
psr(j)qsr(j)dj = Er;
(1)
where ® > 0 is a utility parameter; Er stands for the expenditure; pr(i) denotes the price of
variety i, produced in country r; and qsr(j) stands for the per-capita consumption of variety j,
produced in country s and sold in country r.
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We show in Appendix A that the demand functions for country-r consumers are given as
follows:
qrr(i) =
Er ¡ 1
®
Z
­r
ln
·
pr(i)
pr(j)
¸
pr(j)dj ¡ 1
®
Z
­s
ln
·
pr(i)
ps(j)
¸
ps(j)djZ
­r
pr(j)dj +
Z
­s
ps(j)dj
; (2)
qsr(j) =
Er ¡ 1
®
Z
­r
ln
·
ps(j)
pr(i)
¸
pr(i)di¡ 1
®
Z
­s
ln
·
ps(j)
ps(i)
¸
ps(i)diZ
­r
pr(i)di+
Z
­s
ps(i)di
: (3)
Mirror expressions hold for country-s consumers. Because of the continuum assumption ¯rms
are negligible, so that the own-price derivatives of the demand functions are given as follows:
@qrr(i)
@pr(i)
= ¡ 1
®pr(i)
@qsr(j)
@ps(j)
= ¡ 1
®ps(j)
; (4)
which then yields the variable demand elasticities "rr(i) = [®qrr(i)]
¡1 and "sr(j) = [®qsr(j)]¡1.
Mirror expressions hold again for country s.
2.2 Technology
All ¯rms have access to the same increasing returns to scale technology. To produce Q(i) units
of any variety requires l(i) = cQ(i)+F units of labor, where F is the ¯xed and c is the marginal
labor requirement. We assume that ¯rms can costlessly di®erentiate their products and that
there are no scope economies. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between ¯rms and
varieties, so that the mass of varieties N also stands for the mass of ¯rms operating in the
global economy. There is free entry and exit in each country, which implies that nr and ns
are endogenously determined by the zero pro¯t conditions. Consequently, the expenditure Er
equals the wage wr in country r.
International markets are assumed to be integrated, so that ¯rm i 2 ­r sets a unique
free-on-board price pr(i) for consumers in both countries. Its pro¯t is then as follows:
¦r(i) = [pr(i)¡ cwr]Qr(i)¡ Fwr; (5)
where Qr(i) ´ Lrqrr(i) + Lsqrs(i) stands for its total output.
2.3 Equilibrium
Country-r (resp., country-s) ¯rms maximize their pro¯t (5) with respect to pr(i) (resp., ps(j)),
taking the vectors (nr; ns) and (wr; ws) of ¯rm distribution and factor prices as given.
4 This
4It is well known that price and quantity competition yield the same outcome in monopolistic competition
models with a continuum of ¯rms (Vives, 1999, p.168).
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yields the following ¯rst-order conditions:
@¦r(i)
@pr(i)
= Qr(i) + [pr(i)¡ cwr]
·
Lr
@qrr(i)
@pr(i)
+ Ls
@qrs(i)
@pr(i)
¸
= 0; (6)
@¦s(j)
@ps(j)
= Qs(j) + [ps(j)¡ cws]
·
Ls
@qss(j)
@ps(j)
+ Lr
@qsr(j)
@ps(j)
¸
= 0: (7)
Conditions (6) and (7) highlight a fundamental property of monopolistic competition models:
although each ¯rm is negligible to the market, it must take into account the aggregate pricing
decisions of the other ¯rms since their prices enter its ¯rst-order condition.
We de¯ne a price equilibrium as a distribution of prices satisfying (6) and (7) for all i 2 ­r
and j 2 ­s. We will discuss its existence, uniqueness, and some other properties in the following
sections.5
An equilibrium is a price equilibrium and vectors (nr; ns) and (wr; ws) of ¯rm distribution
and factor prices such that national factor markets clear, trade is balanced, and ¯rms earn zero
pro¯ts. More formally, an equilibrium is a solution to the following three conditions:Z
­r
£
cQr(i) + F
¤
di = Lr; (8)Z
­s
£
cQs(j) + F
¤
dj = Ls; (9)
Ls
Z
­r
pr(i)qrs(i)di = Lr
Z
­s
ps(j)qsr(j)dj; (10)
where all quantities are evaluated at a price equilibrium. It is readily veri¯ed that ¯rms earn
zero pro¯ts when conditions (8){(10) hold. One may set either wr or ws as the numeraire.
However, we need not choose a numeraire, since the model is fully determined in real terms.6
3 Autarky
Assuming that the two countries cannot trade initially with each other, we ¯rst characterize
the equilibrium and the optimum in the closed economy, and show that there is excess entry in
equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we consider country r in what follows.
5As shown by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977), the existence of (price) equilibria is usually problematic in
monopolistic competition models, since ¯rms' reaction functions may be badly behaved. Because our model
relies on a continuum of ¯rms, which are individually negligible, we do not face this problem. In a similar
spirit, Neary (2003) uses a general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition with a continuum of sectors,
in which ¯rms are `large' in their own markets but `negligible' in the whole economy. This also allows to restore
equilibrium since ¯rms cannot directly in°uence aggregates of the whole economy.
6The choice of the numeraire is immaterial in our monopolistic competition framework. This is an important
departure from general equilibrium oligopoly models, where the choice of the numeraire is usually not neutral
(Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972).
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3.1 Equilibrium
Inserting (2){(4) into (6), and letting qrs(i) = @qrs(i)=@pr(i) = 0 and qsr(j) = @qsr(j)=@ps(j) = 0,
one can show that the unique price equilibrium is symmetric and given as follows (see Behrens
and Murata, 2007, for the proof):
par =
µ
1 +
®
cnar
¶
cwar ; (11)
where an a-superscript henceforth denotes autarky values. At the symmetric price equilibrium,
the pro¯t of each ¯rm is given by ¦ar = Lrq
a
rr (p
a
r ¡ cwar )¡ Fwar . Using the consumer's budget
constraint war = n
a
rp
a
rq
a
rr, the above expression can be rewritten as
¦ar = p
a
rq
a
rr[Lr (1¡ cnarqarr)¡ Fnar ]:
Zero pro¯ts then imply that the quantities must be such that
qarr =
1
c
µ
1
nar
¡ F
Lr
¶
; (12)
which are positive because narF < Lr must hold from the resource constraint when n
a
r ¯rms
operate. Utility is then given by
U(nar) = n
a
r
·
1¡ e¡®c

1
nar
¡ F
Lr
¸
: (13)
Note that (12) and (13) hold whenever prices are symmetric and ¯rms earn zero pro¯t.
Inserting qarr = w
a
r=(n
a
rp
a
r) into the labor market clearing condition (8), we get:
nar =
Lr
F
µ
1¡ cw
a
r
par
¶
: (14)
The equilibrium mass of ¯rms can then be found by using (11) and (14), which yields:7
nar =
p
4®cFLr + (®F )2 ¡ ®F
2cF
> 0: (15)
Finally, inserting (15) into (13), the equilibrium utility in autarky is given by
U(Lr) =
p
4®cFLr + (®F )2 ¡ ®F
2cF
·
1¡ e¡
2®Fp
4®cFLr+(®F )2+®F
¸
> 0; (16)
which is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of the population size Lr for all
admissible parameter values, i.e., ® > 0, c > 0, F > 0, and Lr > 0.
7Note that the other root is negative and must, therefore, be ruled out.
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3.2 Optimum
We now determine the socially optimal mass of varieties. The planner maximizes the utility, as
given by (1), subject to the technology and resource constraints (8). The ¯rst-order conditions
of this problem with respect to qrr(i) show that the quantities must be symmetric. This,
together with (8), implies that:
qrr =
Qr
Lr
=
1
c
µ
1
nr
¡ F
Lr
¶
: (17)
Hence, the planner maximizes
U(nor) = n
o
r
·
1¡ e¡®c

1
nor
¡ F
Lr
¸
; (18)
with respect to nor, where an o-superscript henceforth denotes the optimal values.
8 Standard
calculations show that
@U
@nor
= 1¡
µ
1 +
®
cnor
¶
e
¡®
c

1
nor
¡ F
Lr

(19)
and that U is a strictly concave function of nor. Equating (19) to zero, utility maximization
requires the ¯rst-order condition
cnor
®+ cnor
= e
¡®
c

1
nor
¡ F
Lr

=) ¡
µ
1 +
®
cnor
¶
e
¡

1+ ®
cnor

= ¡e¡1¡ ®FcLr : (20)
By de¯nition of the Lambert W function, the latter can be rewritten as9
¡
µ
1 +
®
cnor
¶
= W
³
¡e¡1¡ ®FcLr
´
:
Solving this equation for nor yields a unique optimal mass of ¯rms
nor = ¡
®
c
h
1 +W¡1
³
¡e¡1¡ ®FcLr
´i > 0; (21)
where W¡1 is the real branch of the Lambert W function satisfying W (¡e¡1¡®F=(cLr)) · ¡1
(Corless et al., 1996, pp.330-331).10 Note that W¡1 is increasing in Lr and that ¡1 < W¡1 <
¡1 for 0 < Lr <1. Furthermore, using (20) we can show the following excess entry result.
Proposition 1 There are too many ¯rms operating at an ine±ciently small scale in equilibrium,
i.e., nar > n
o
r.
Proof. See Appendix B.
8As shown in Behrens and Murata (2006, Appendix B), alternative policies: (i) marginal cost pricing and
lump-sum transfers; and (ii) pro¯t-maximizing prices and non-negative pro¯ts, boil down to the same problem.
9Formally, the Lambert W function is de¯ned as the inverse of the function x 7! xex (Corless et al., 1996).
10As ¡e¡1 < ¡e¡1¡®F=(cLr) < 0, there is another possible real value of W (¡e¡1¡®F=(cLr)) satisfying ¡1 <
W (¡e¡1¡®F=(cLr)) < 0. However, it leads to nor < 0 and must, therefore, be ruled out.
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Note that excess entry arises because of pro-competitive e®ects (@par=@n
a
r < 0 by (11)). The
negative externality each ¯rm imposes on the other ¯rms gives rise to the `business-stealing
e®ect' (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986, p.49), i.e., the equilibrium output per ¯rm declines as the
number of ¯rms grows (@Qar=@n
a
r = @(Lrq
a
rr)=@n
a
r < 0 by (12)).
Interestingly, this result contrasts starkly with the constant elasticity case, where the equi-
librium mass of varieties is (second-best) optimal.11 Stated di®erently, the basic CES model
does not account for the tendency that too many ¯rms produce at ine±ciently small scale in
autarky (the so-called `Eastman-Stykolt hypothesis'; Eastman and Stykolt, 1967), an argument
often used to criticize import-substituting industrialization policies (Krugman and Obstfeld,
2003, pp.261-263) or tari® barriers (Horstmann and Markusen, 1986) on e±ciency grounds.
Finally, combining (18) and (20) yields U o(nor) = ®n
o
r=(® + cn
o
r). Inserting (21) into this
expression, the optimal utility is given by
U o(Lr) = ¡ ®
cW¡1
³
¡e¡1¡ ®FcLr
´ > 0; (22)
which is a strictly increasing function of the population size Lr for all admissible parameter
values, i.e., ® > 0, c > 0, F > 0, and Lr > 0.
4 Free trade
We now analyze the impacts of trade on welfare and e±ciency in a world with pro-competitive
e®ects and a competitive limit. Section 4:1 analyzes the equilibrium. Section 4:2 then shows
the existence of gains from trade and decomposes them into gains from product diversity and
gains from pro-competitive e®ects. Section 4:3 ¯nally illustrates that trade narrows the gap
between the equilibrium utility and the optimal utility by driving prices closer to marginal
costs.
4.1 Equilibrium
We have shown that the pro¯t-maximizing price under autarky is given by (11), where nar is
given by (15). Therefore, unlike in the standard CES model, markups in autarky are no longer
the same across countries of di®erent sizes. Nevertheless, we now show that free trade leads not
only to the equalization of price-wage ratios, but also to product and factor price equalization.
Assume that both countries can trade freely. The pro¯ts and the ¯rst-order conditions are still
given by (5){(7), respectively. Using these expressions, we establish the following proposition.
11This can be seen from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, p.301), when letting s = 1 and µ = 0 in their equations
(20) and (21), since there is no homogeneous good in our setting. Note that the two-factor two-sector CES
trade model by Lawrence and Spiller (1983, p.68) even displays insu±cient entry. This runs against the general
tendency of excess entry obtained under \a range of very plausible situations" (Vives, 1999, p.176).
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Proposition 2 Free trade leads to product and factor price equalization for all admissible pa-
rameter values.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that there is a priori no reason for product price equalization to hold in our setting,
even under free trade.12 This is because ¯rms sell di®erentiated varieties, factor markets are
segmented, and ¯rms are imperfectly competitive.
From Proposition 2, we know that pr = ps = p and wr = ws = w, which allows us to rewrite
(2){(4) as follows:
qrr = qsr = qss = qrs =
w
Np
(23)
and
@qrr
@pr
=
@qsr
@ps
=
@qss
@ps
=
@qrs
@pr
= ¡ 1
®p
: (24)
Inserting (23) and (24) into the ¯rst-order condition (6), we obtain the price equilibrium:
p =
³
1 +
®
cN
´
cw; (25)
which is an extension of the autarky case (11). Since prices and wages are equalized, all
¯rms sell the same total quantity Q = (Lr + Ls)q. Labor market clearing then implies that
nr=ns = Lr=Ls, which yields
nr =
Lr
F
µ
1¡ cw
p
¶
: (26)
Plugging (25) into (26) and the analogous expression for country s, we obtain two equations
with two unknowns nr and ns. Solving for the equilibrium masses of ¯rms, we get
nr =
Lr
Lr + Ls
p
4®cF (Lr + Ls) + (®F )2 ¡ ®F
2cF
ns =
Ls
Lr + Ls
p
4®cF (Lr + Ls) + (®F )2 ¡ ®F
2cF
:
Thus, the equilibrium mass of ¯rms in the global economy is given by
N = nr + ns =
p
4®cF (Lr + Ls) + (®F )2 ¡ ®F
2cF
; (27)
which is an extension of the autarky expression (15). It is readily veri¯ed thatN > maxfnar ; nasg,
thus implying that p=w < minfpar=war ; pas=wasg from (11) and (25). Finally, from expressions
(14) and (26), we obtain nr < n
a
r and ns < n
a
s . Hence, the relationship between trade and
product diversity can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 When compared with autarky, the mass of varieties produced in each country
decreases under free trade, whereas the mass of varieties consumed in each country increases.
12Most studies assume, rather than prove, that product price equalization holds under free trade (e.g., Help-
man, 1981).
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Proposition 3 illustrates exit of ¯rms due to the pro-competitive e®ects of international trade.
Once trade occurs, the price-cost margins in both countries decrease, thus driving some ¯rms
out of each national market (Krugman, 1979; Feenstra, 2004, Ch.5).13 Factor market clearing
then makes sure that ¯rm-level and total production expands, as labor is reallocated from the
¯xed requirements of closing ¯rms to the marginal requirements of surviving ¯rms. This is an
important departure from the CES model, in which such an e®ect does not arise. Note also
that Proposition 2 holds regardless of country size. In autarky, a smaller country tends to have
a smaller mass of ¯rms, which implies a higher price-wage ratio. Therefore, the price-wage
ratio in a small country decreases more than that in a large country under free trade, i.e., we
observe convergence in price-wage ratios across countries.
Note, ¯nally, that although there is a growing literature on ¯rm heterogeneity in interna-
tional trade (e.g., Melitz, 2003), the price-cost margin for each ¯rm is usually assumed to be
constant in these models because of the CES speci¯cation.14 By contrast, our model captures
the `old idea' that international trade under imperfect competition leads to lower markups and
hence to exit of ¯rms even without ¯rm heterogeneity (Dixit and Norman, 1980).
4.2 Welfare decomposition and gains from trade
We now discuss gains from trade by decomposing welfare as in Krugman (1981). Since varieties
are symmetric under both free trade and autarky, the utility di®erence is given by:
U r ¡ Uar = N
³
1¡ e¡®wNp
´
¡ nar
µ
1¡ e¡
®war
narp
a
r
¶
:
Adding and subtracting nare
¡®w=(narp), and rearranging the resulting terms, we obtain the fol-
lowing welfare decomposition:
U r ¡ Uar = N
³
1¡ e¡®wNp
´
¡ nar
³
1¡ e¡ ®wnarp
´
| {z }
Product diversity
+ nar
³
e
¡ ®w
a
r
narp
a
r ¡ e¡ ®wnarp
´
| {z }
Pro-competitive e®ects
; (28)
which isolates the two channels, namely product diversity and pro-competitive e®ects, through
which gains from trade materialize in our model.
We now examine the role and the sign of each component in expression (28) in more details,
both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view.
13In Lawrence and Spiller (1983, Proposition 7), international trade leads to a redistribution of existing ¯rms
between the two countries while the total mass of ¯rms remains unchanged. This result is driven by changes in
relative factor prices under free trade and, as pointed out by the authors, need not hold under variable markups.
14One notable exception is Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who recently proposed a model that explains trade-
induced exit by combining pro-competitive e®ects and ¯rm heterogeneity in a quasi-linear framework. Yet, the
quasi-linear speci¯cation rules out income e®ects and gives their model a partial equilibrium °avor.
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Product diversity: As shown in Proposition 3, trade expands product diversity, as in the
CES case, despite the exit of some domestic producers. Ceteris paribus this raises utility via
`love-of-variety', which can be seen as follows. Given the wage-price ratio under free trade,
w=p, we have
Ur = N
³
1¡ e¡®wNp
´
;
@Ur
@N
= 1¡ e¡®wNp
µ
1 +
®w
Np
¶
> 0 8N:
To obtain the last inequality, let z ´ ®w=(Np) and h(z) ´ 1¡e¡z(1+z). Clearly, h(0) = 0 and
h0(z) > 0 for all z > 0, which shows that for any given wage-price ratio w=p, utility increases
with the range of varieties consumed.
Despite its central theoretical role in new trade theory, little is known until now about
the empirical importance of gains from product diversity (Feenstra, 1995). Using extremely
disaggregated data, Broda and Weinstein (2006) document that the number of product varieties
in US imports rose by 212% between 1972 and 2001, and according to their estimates this maps
into US welfare gains of about 2:6% of GDP. This ¯nding suggests that product diversity is an
important real-world channel through which gains from trade materialize.
Pro-competitive e®ects: The second term in (28) captures the bene¯cial e®ects of increased
price competition in the product market, driving prices closer to marginal costs. This can be
seen by comparing expressions (11) and (25). Note that war=p
a
r = w=p would hold in the CES
case, i.e., there would be no gains from trade due to pro-competitive e®ects.
It is well known from various industrial organization studies that prices in many imperfectly
competitive industries are increasing functions of producer concentration (see Schmalensee,
1989, pp.987-988, for a survey). In our symmetric equilibrium, the Her¯ndahl-index of con-
centration, de¯ned as the sum of squared market shares, reduces to H = N(1=N)2 = 1=N .
Since the mass of ¯rms is increasing in market size in our model, markups are lower in larger
markets (see Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005, for empirical evidence). Similarly, by increas-
ing the number of competitors in each market, import competition decreases concentration,
which maps into lower consumer prices. Several case studies con¯rm this `imports-as-market-
discipline hypothesis' (e.g., Levinsohn, 1993; Harrison, 1994; Tybout, 2003). More recently,
Badinger (2007) ¯nds solid evidence that the Single Market Programme of the EU has reduced
markups by 26% in aggregate manufacturing of 10 member states.
Let us summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 4 Free trade raises welfare both by expanding consumers' choice sets (`product
diversity') and by driving prices closer to marginal costs (`pro-competitive e®ects').
Proof. To prove our claim, it is su±cient to examine the sign of the two components in (28).
As shown above, they are both positive, which ensures gains from trade.
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4.3 Competition and e±ciency
In Section 3.2 we have considered the case in which each national government maximizes its own
welfare under its domestic resource constraint (`decentralized' ¯rst-best). As shown by Behrens
and Murata (2006, Appendix D), doing so is equivalent to letting a global planner maximize
world welfare under a global resource constraint (`centralized' ¯rst-best). Put di®erently, if nor
and nos is a decentralized optimum, then N
o = nor + n
o
s is a centralized optimum. Conversely,
if N o is a centralized optimum, then nor = (Lr=L)N
o and nos = (Ls=L)N
o is a decentralized
optimum, where L ´ Lr + Ls. The optimal utilities under both regimes are the same.
Since in our model free trade amounts to increasing the population size, the result on excess
entry established in Section 3.2 continues to hold, even under free trade. Stated di®erently,
there is a unique optimal mass of ¯rms N o < N satisfying the ¯rst-order condition (20) under
free trade. Hence, there are too many ¯rms operating at an ine±ciently small scale and the
market outcome is not e±cient. Figure 1 depicts a typical example of N=N o as a function of
L.15 It shows that excess entry gets larger as population increases. Yet, for any given value of
L, the smaller the value of ® the narrower the gap between the equilibrium and the optimum.
Furthermore, limL!0N=N o = 1 and limL!1N=N o =
p
2 hold regardless of parameter values.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
On the contrary, combining (25) and (27) we obtain pro-competitive e®ects as follows:
p
cw
= 1 +
2®Fp
4®cFL+ (®F )2 ¡ ®F and
@
@L
³ p
cw
´
< 0: (29)
It is then readily veri¯ed that our model exhibits a competitive limit
lim
L!0
p
cw
=1 and lim
L!1
p
cw
= 1;
so that prices converge to marginal costs as population gets arbitrarily large. Despite the fact
that excess entry tends to get worse as population increases, such losses are dominated by
e±ciency gains from the competitive limit, thus yielding the following e±ciency result.16
Proposition 5 When the population gets arbitrarily large in the integrated economy, the equi-
librium utility converges to the optimal utility, i.e.,
lim
L!1
U(L) = lim
L!1
U o(L) =
®
c
:
15The parameter values are as follows: ® = 0:1; 1; 5 from above; c = 0:5; and F = 1. Other admissible
parameter values yield qualitatively similar ¯gures, thus suggesting that the underlying property is robust.
16This result is reminiscent of Mankiw and Whinston (1986, Proposition 3) who establish conditions for the
equilibrium utility in a partial equilibrium model to converge to the optimal utility when excess entry gets large.
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Proof. Applying the l'Hospital's rule to (16), it is readily veri¯ed that limL!1 U(L) = ®=c.
Furthermore, by de¯nition of the Lambert W function, limL!1W¡1(¡e¡1¡®F=(cL)) = ¡1 holds.
Hence, taking the limit of expression (22) yields limL!1 U o(L) = ®=c.17
The limit result established in Proposition 5 may be extended to a ¯nite economy by inves-
tigating whether
max
½
U(Lr)
U o(Lr)
;
U(Ls)
U o(Ls)
¾
<
U(L)
U o(L)
< 1; (30)
where the last inequality comes from the de¯nition of the optimum. To this end, we check
whether the ratio of equilibrium to optimal utility U=U o monotonically increases in L. This is
not a trivial question since both the equilibrium and the optimal utility increase in L, as can
be seen from (16) and (22).
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Figure 2 depicts a typical example of U=U o as a function of L.18 As U=U o < 1 the market
outcome remains ine±cient for ¯nite population sizes. However, for any given value of L, the
smaller the value of ®, the narrower the gap between the equilibrium and the optimum. The
reason is that a smaller value of ® implies lower p=(cw) for all L by (29). Furthermore, since
U=U o increases monotonically with L, trade between larger countries yields higher e±ciency
than trade between smaller countries.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a VES model of international trade displaying pro-competitive e®ects and a
competitive limit and investigated the impact of trade on welfare and e±ciency. First, we have
shown that, unlike in the standard CES model, there is excess entry due to pro-competitive
e®ects. Second, even in the presence of pro-competitive e®ects and product di®erentiation,
free trade leads to product and factor price equalization between countries of di®erent sizes.
Third, we have illustrated the well-known property that trade leads to an increase in the mass
of varieties consumed, and to a decrease in the mass of varieties produced, in each country.
In addition, we have shown that exit due to pro-competitive e®ects is accompanied by an
increase in output per ¯rm because of resource reallocation from the ¯xed to the marginal labor
requirement, leading to a better exploitation of ¯rm-level scale economies. Fourth, contrary
to the CES case, our model allows for a welfare decomposition between gains from product
diversity and gains from pro-competitive e®ects. Finally, we have illustrated that trade is
17See Behrens and Murata (2006, Appendix E) for an alternative proof without using the Lambert W function.
18The parameter values are as follows: ® = 0:1; 1; 5 from above; c = 0:5; and F = 1. Other admissible
parameter values yield qualitatively similar ¯gures, thus suggesting that the underlying property is robust.
Furthermore, limL!0 U=Uo = 1¡ e¡1 ¼ 0:63 holds regardless of parameter values.
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e±ciency enhancing through increased competition. In particular, as the population size gets
arbitrarily large in the integrated economy, the equilibrium utility converges to the optimal
utility because of a competitive limit.
The framework presented in this paper is °exible enough to allow for many extensions,
including heterogeneous ¯rms and trade costs (Behrens et al., 2009) and heterogeneous con-
sumers (Behrens and Murata, 2009). The next step is to extend our model to a multi-sector
setting in order to fully explore the impact of trade on e±ciency. In our model, trade tends
to reduce within-sector e±ciency losses, which disappear at the competitive limit. However,
as is well known, markup heterogeneity across sectors is a source of between-sector distortions
(Bilbiie et al., 2008; Epifani and Gancia, 2009), which may become more important with freer
trade. Whereas Epifani and Gancia (2009) show that trade may reduce e±ciency, the existence
of a competitive limit in our model suggests that trade ultimately leads to e±ciency gains even
with multiple sectors since prices in each sector converge to marginal costs as the mass of ¯rms
gets su±ciently large. Establishing this formally is left for future research.
Finally, as we have obtained the closed form solutions for the equilibrium utility and the
optimal utility, our model can also be extended to a multi-region setting in a spatial economy.
Doing so sheds new light on whether or not larger cities are more e±cient. In such a setting, a
larger population exacerbates not only excess entry but also congestion in cities while achieving
prices closer to marginal costs. Although we have shown that e±ciency gains from the com-
petitive limit dominate e±ciency losses from excess entry, it is not obvious whether or not our
result carries over to a spatial economy with urban congestion. Exploring this formally is also
left for future research.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the demand functions
A representative consumer in country r solves problem (1). Letting ¸ stand for the Lagrange
multiplier, the ¯rst-order conditions for an interior solution are given by:
®e¡®qrr(i) = ¸pr(i); 8i 2 ­r (31)
®e¡®qsr(j) = ¸ps(j); 8j 2 ­s (32)
and the budget constraintZ
­r
pr(k)qrr(k)dk +
Z
­s
ps(k)qsr(k)dk = Er: (33)
Taking the ratio of (31) with respect to i and j, we obtain
e¡®[qrr(i)¡qrr(j)] =
pr(i)
pr(j)
=) qrr(i) = qrr(j) + 1
®
ln
·
pr(j)
pr(i)
¸
8i; j 2 ­r:
Multiplying the last expression by pr(j) and integrating with respect to j 2 ­r we obtain:
qrr(i)
Z
­r
pr(j)dj =
Z
­r
pr(j)qrr(j)dj +
1
®
Z
­r
ln
·
pr(j)
pr(i)
¸
pr(j)dj: (34)
Analogously, taking the ratio of (31) and (32) with respect to i and j, we get:
e¡®[qrr(i)¡qsr(j)] =
pr(i)
ps(j)
=) qrr(i) = qsr(j) + 1
®
ln
·
ps(j)
pr(i)
¸
8i 2 ­r;8j 2 ­s:
Multiplying the last expression by ps(j) and integrating with respect to j 2 ­s we obtain:
qrr(i)
Z
­s
ps(j)dj =
Z
­s
ps(j)qsr(j)dj +
1
®
Z
­s
ln
·
ps(j)
pr(i)
¸
ps(j)dj: (35)
Summing (34) and (35), and using the budget constraint (33), we ¯nally obtain the demands
(2). The derivations of the demands (3) are analogous.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
We need to compare the market outcome nar and the optimum n
o
r de¯ned as the solution of the
equation:
f(nr) = g(nr); where f(nr) ´ cnr
®+ cnr
and g(nr) ´ e¡
®
c (
1
nr
¡ F
Lr
): (36)
Note ¯rst that f is strictly increasing in nr, taking values from 0 to 1, and that g is also strictly
increasing, taking values from 0 to e®F=(cLr) > 1. Some standard calculations show that there
is a unique intersection since: (i) both functions are continuous; (ii) f is concave, whereas g
is convex for nr su±ciently small; (iii) the slope of f is strictly greater than that of g for nr
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su±ciently small;19 and (iv) g admits a single value for which its second-order derivative is
equal to zero.
We next show that nar > n
o
r. To prove our claim, we use a convexity argument. The
equilibrium mass of varieties is given by (15), whereas the optimal mass of varieties is the
unique solution to (36). First, evaluate f at nar , which yields
f(nar) =
cnar
®+ cnar
=
¡®F +p®F (4cLr + ®F )
®F +
p
®F (4cLr + ®F )
=
¡2®F +Xr
Xr
; (37)
where Xr ´ ®F +
p
®F (4cLr + ®F ). Second, evaluate g at n
a
r to get
g(nar) = e
¡®
c

1
nar
¡ F
Lr

= e¡
2®F
Xr : (38)
Let Yr ´ (2®F )=Xr < 1 and g(Yr) = e¡Yr . Note that (37) can then be expressed as f(Yr) =
1¡ Yr, which is tangent to (38) at Yr = 0:
1¡ Yr = g(0) + g0(0)(Yr ¡ 0):
Since (38) is strictly convex, it lies strictly above its tangent. Put di®erently, f(Yr) = 1¡ Yr <
e¡Yr = g(Yr) holds for all Yr > 0 (see Figure A1). Hence, the right-hand side of (36) exceeds
the left-hand side of (36) at the equilibrium mass of ¯rms nar . By uniqueness of the optimal
mass of ¯rms, and since the right-hand side of (36) exceeds the left-hand side if and only if
nr > n
o
r, we may conclude that n
a
r > n
o
r, which proves our claim (see Figure A2).
[Insert Figures A1 and A2 around here]
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
Conditions (6) and (7) must hold for both country-r and country-s ¯rms at every price equi-
librium which, using (2){(4), yields
@¦r(i)
@pr(i)
¡ @¦s(j)
@ps(j)
= 0 () c
·
wr
pr(i)
¡ ws
ps(j)
¸
= ln
µ
pr(i)
ps(j)
¶
: (39)
19To check this, note that limnr!0 f
0(nr) = c=® > limnr!0 g
0(nr) = 0. The last equality is obtained as
follows. Noting that
ln g0(nr) = ¡ 2
nr
·
ln(nr)
1=nr
+
®
2c
¸
+ ln
³®
c
´
+
®F
cL
;
and that limnr!0 lnnr=(1=nr) = 0 by l'Hospital's rule, we have
lim
nr!0
ln g0(nr) = ¡ lim
nr!0
2
nr
£ lim
nr!0
·
ln(nr)
1=nr
+
®
2c
¸
+ ln
³®
c
´
+
®F
cL
= ¡1;
which, by continuity of the logarithmic function, implies limnr!0 g
0(nr) = 0:
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It is also readily veri¯ed that
Qr(i) T Qs(j) () ¡Lr + Ls
®
ln
·
pr(i)
ps(j)
¸
T 0: (40)
Furthermore, an equilibrium is such that ¯rms earn zero pro¯t, i.e.,
¦r(i) = wr
½·
pr(i)
wr
¡ c
¸
Qr(i)¡ F
¾
= 0
¦s(j) = ws
½·
ps(j)
ws
¡ c
¸
Qs(j)¡ F
¾
= 0:
Assume that there exists i 2 ­r and j 2 ­s such that pr(i) > ps(j). Then condition (39)
implies that
wr
pr(i)
>
ws
ps(j)
=) pr(i)
wr
<
ps(j)
ws
;
whereas condition (40) implies that Qr(i) < Qs(j). Hence, ¦r(i) < ¦s(j), which is incompatible
with an equilibrium. We may hence conclude that pr(i) = ps(j) must hold for all i 2 ­r and
j 2 ­s, which shows that product prices are equalized. Condition (39) then shows that wr = ws,
i.e., factor prices are equalized whenever product prices are equalized, which proves our claim.
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Figure 1: N=N o as a function of L.
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Figure A1: f and g as a function of Yr.
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